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FAMLY LAW AND ESTATE LAW-REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY-
USE OF ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AFTER THE DEATH OF
A PARENT
I. INTRODUCTION
After eleven years of marriage and numerous unsuccessful attempts at
becoming pregnant, Wade Jr. and Amy Finley participated in an In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (IVF/ET) Program at the University of
Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS).' In filling out consent forms out-
lining their participation in the IVF/ET Program, Wade Jr. "agreed to 'rec-
ognize any children born after the IVF procedure as [his] legitimate
offspring."' 2 Both parents also acknowledged a clause stating:
Your embryos will remain frozen and in storage until you direct the IVF
personnel otherwise. The legal status of frozen embryos is not known.
Should you get a divorce or one or both of you die, the disposition of the
frozen embryos might be determined in a court of law. You should con-
sider this issue very carefully and obtain expert legal advice if neces-
3
sary.
Physicians implanted two of the embryos in Amy, while they froze
4four other embryos for preservation. Amy miscarried both implanted em-
bryos.s One month after the embryo implantation, Wade Jr. unexpectedly
died in a work-related accident6; he died intestate.7 Approximately one year
after Wade Jr.'s death, Amy had physicians thaw two of the frozen embryos
and implant them in her uterus.8 Nine months later, she gave birth to their
son, Wade III.9 A court subsequently denied Amy's claim for workers'
compensation benefits for Wade III because it found that Wade III was not
"dependant" upon his father.o The Social Security Administration also de-
nied insurance benefits for Amy and Wade 111.11 The courts left Amy and
her child without financial support from her late husband's employer or
estate.
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Finley v. Astrue reached its decision
regarding insurance benefits by narrowly interpreting Arkansas intestacy
1. Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. 103, 105, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (2008).
2. Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1095 (E.D. Ark. 2009).
3. Id.
4. Finley, 372 Ark. at 105-06, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
5. Id. at 106, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
6. Finley, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1095.
7. Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 292, 293, 288 S.W.3d 685, 687 (2008).
8. Id., 288 S.W.3d at 687.
9. Id., 288 S.W.3d at 687.
10. Id. at 293-94, 288 S.W.3d at 687.
11. Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. 103, 105, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (2008).
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laws. 12 These intestacy statutes require that a child who is to receive bene-
fits from a deceased parent must have been conceived before the parent's
death. 13 The court refused to broadly interpret the intestacy statutes, thereby
excluding from coverage children like Wade III who have been posthu-
mously conceived through IVF.14 At least eight states have more clearly
defined the rights of children who are born from fertilized embryos that
have been implanted after the death of a parent." Arkansas should follow
suit and establish intestacy rights for children who came from fertilized em-
bryos implanted after the death of a parent.
This note will first discuss in vitro fertilization and some of the reasons
why couples take part in that process.16 It will then analyze legal problems
that may arise for children born through postmortem embryo implantation.17
It will also look at judicial decisions to see how other states have treated
inheritance issues for children conceived posthumously.' 8 The next section
of this note will offer possible solutions for Arkansas courts and the state
legislature to ensure that children conceived posthumously are protected and
given inheritance rights from their deceased parent's estate.19 Lastly, this
note will conclude by asserting that children born from postmortem embryo
implantation are entitled to benefits and rights from their deceased parent.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. In Vitro Fertilization and Cryopreservation
As the procedures become more accessible, the use of artificial repro-
ductive technologies is becoming more widespread. Two such procedures,
in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation, when used in conjunction, can
assist a couple in having a child together in the future, even after a partner
has died.2'
12. Finley, 372 Ark. 103, 270 S.W.3d 849.
13. Id. at 110,270 S.W.3d at 853.
14. See id. at 110-11, 270 S.W. 3dat853-54.
15. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5-.8 (West Supp. 2010); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:391.1 (2008). For a state by state review of legislation on treatment of frozen embryos,
see National Conference of State Legislatures, Embryo and Gamete Disposition Laws (July
2007), available at http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearchlHealth/EmbryoandGamete
DispositionLaws/tabid/14379/Default.aspx.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part H.A.
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In vitro fertilization (IVF) is the process by which an egg is fertilized
outside the body in a controlled experimental environment before being
"inserted into the womb for gestation."2 2 Usually, before an egg is retrieved
from the body, a woman takes a variety of hormones to encourage her ova-
ries to produce a large amount of eggs for retrieval in the TVF procedure to
increase the odds of fertilization, and thus pregnancy. After the ovaries
have been hyper-stimulated, eggs are retrieved from the woman's body and
then fertilized with sperm. 24 After about forty hours of culturing, the em-
bryos can be transferred to the uterine cavity or frozen in liquid nitrogen for
transfer in a future natural cycle; this latter process is called cryopreserva-
tion. Between twenty and twenty-five percent of implanted embryos result
in term pregnancies.26 Storing fertilized embryos for future use through
cryopreservation is a significant step in IVF because not all of the embryos
need to be immediately implanted upon fertilization.27 To increase the
chances of becoming pregnant through IVF, and to decrease the likelihood
of multiple births, the use of cryopreservation allows the embryo implanta-
tion process to take place over multiple natural cycles.28
There are numerous reasons why a couple may choose to use these ar-
tificial reproductive technologies. 2 9 A couple might utilize IVF because of
infertility, because of male dysfunctions, 3 0 because they are a same-sex
couple who wish to have children together, or for a variety of other medical
reasons.31 Women may elect to cryopreserve their eggs while they are at the
peak of their fertility, 32 while men may choose to cryopreserve their sperm
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 846(9th ed. 2009).
23. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 87 (1995).
24. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1995 (Mark H. Beers, M.D. &
Robert Berkow, M.D. eds., Merck Research Laboratories 17th ed. 1999) (1899).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 85 (American Bar Asso-
ciation 2006).
28. Id.
29. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 7 (American Bar Associ-
ation, Supp. 2009).
30. Some common male dysfunctions that affect fertility include "defects in the produc-
tion of viable sperm; ... defects in semen production; or ... obstruction in pathways through
which the sperm must travel." Melissa R. O'Rourke, The Status of Infertility Treatments and
Insurance Coverage: Some Hopes and Frustrations, 37 S.D. L. REV. 343, 349 (1992).
31. See also KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 25, at 7 (including a substantial risk of
having "offspring with inheritable disease or genetic abnormalities," retaining the option of
having children after undergoing cancer treatment that may affect fertility, or to increase
potential fertility).
32. Id. at 84.
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for later use if they are at risk for developing future fertility problems.33
Parents may cryopreserve embryos for future IVF treatments to check for
possible disease, such as HIV, before implantation.3 4 This note will discuss
another possible use of cryopreservation: to enable a wife to become preg-
nant by her husband after his death.
B. Inheritance Problems That May Arise When a Child Is Born Posthu-
mously Through Assisted Reproductive Technology
In terms of inheritance, treatment of posthumously conceived children
varies from state to state. 35 While "children who are conceived during the
lives of their parents, even if born after the death of a parent, are protected
under the laws of inheritance and are considered lawful heirs,"36 posthu-
mously conceived children must overcomet several burdens to prove they
are the lawful heirs of their deceased parent. 3 7
Inheritance problems typically arise with posthumously conceived
children when the deceased parent has not left a will or trust.38 A child con-
ceived posthumously will likely be able to inherit as the decedent's heir if
the decedent expressed his or her intent to provide for future children and
expressed how his or her property should be distributed. 3 9 When a dece-
dent's express intent is shown through a document or an express agreement
with an assisted reproduction clinic, it should be upheld.4 0
However, when the decedent dies intestate, the issue of inheritance
rights is left to the state to determine. Arkansas will not allow a child to
inherit from a deceased parent unless the child was conceived prior to the
decedent's death.4 1 Under current Arkansas law, children conceived post-
humously are not given any rights to inherit from their deceased parent's
estate, regardless of that parent's intent or consent. 42
33. Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 ARIz. L.
REV. 91, 91 (2004). Examples of such men include athletes prone to groin injuries, soldiers
who risk exposure to something that may cause infertility, or cancer patients whose treatment
may cause infertility.
34. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 27, at 85.
35. For an example, see 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 433.
36. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 27, at 221.
37. See infra Part II D 1.
38. See Kayla VanCannon, Note, Fathering a Child From the Grave: What Are the
Inheritance Rights of Children Born Through New Technology After the Death of a Parent?
52 DRAKE L. REv. 331, 350 (2004).
39. Id.
40. Id.at350-51.
41. Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. 103, 110, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (2008).
42. See infra Part II C.
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The receipt of Social Security benefits depends on the posthumously
conceived child's inheritance status in the state in which the deceased parent
was domiciled. 43 Because state intestacy laws vary, a posthumously con-
ceived child's entitlement to child survivor rights will depend on the state in
which the child was born. When a child is denied inheritance rights through
state law because he or she was not dependent on the parent at the time of
the parent's death, or is otherwise deemed illegitimate, a court may auto-
matically deny the child any sort of Social Security survivor benefits."
C. Arkansas Law on the Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived
Children
Because the technology is fairly new, courts have not had much oppor-
tunity to address or develop this area of law. This section reviews current
Arkansas law addressing inheritance issues of posthumously conceived
children, focusing primarily on the case law produced from Amy Finley's
efforts to obtain inheritance and Social Security benefits for her son. This
section also examines pertinent Arkansas statutory law that controls these
inheritance issues.
Cryopreservation, combined with IVF, allowed Amy Finley to become
pregnant nearly one year after her late husband's death.45 While married,
Amy and Wade Jr. took part in VF and embryo transfer fertility treatments
at UAMS.4 6 Using Amy's eggs and Wade Jr.'s sperm, doctors created ten
embryos for the couple.47 At that time, the Finleys allowed the doctors to
implant two embryos into Amy, and they cryopreserved four embryos. 4 8
Amy subsequently miscarried, and neither of the implanted embryos re-
sulted in a term pregnancy. 49 About a month and a half after the embryos
were implanted, Wade Jr. unexpectedly died during the course of his
work.o
Nearly one year after Wade Jr.'s death, doctors thawed two of the
cryopreserved embryos and implanted them in Amy's uterus; this procedure
resulted in one pregnancy.5 1 Amy gave birth to their child on March 4,
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3), 416(h)(2) (2006).
44. See, e.g., Finley, 372 Ark. 103, 270 S.W.3d 849.
45. Id., at 106, 270 S.W.3d at 850-51.
46. Id. at 105, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
47. Id., 270 S.W.3d at 850.
48. Id. at 105-06, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
49. Id. at 106, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
50. Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 292, 293, 288 S.W.3d 685, 687 (2008).
51. Id., 288 S.W.3d at 687.
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2003.52 After the birth of Wade III, Amy sought Wade III's social security
insurance benefits.53
In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas had to interpret
intestacy law and found that a child "created as an embryo through in vitro
fertilization during his parents' marriage, but implanted into his mother's
womb after the death of his father" is not entitled to inherit from his father
under Arkansas intestacy law as a surviving child.54 Amy also sought to
recover dependency benefits from her late husband's employer for their
child, but the Arkansas Court of Appeals held he was not entitled to them.
Addressing Amy's constitutional arguments, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas held that Amy and her child were
not deprived of equal protection by either Arkansas intestacy law, which
denied her inheritance claims, 56 or by the Social Security Act's definition of
"child,"' which was based on Arkansas intestacy law.
In deciding that children born by means of artificial reproductive tech-
nology more than nine months after their father's death are not entitled to
inherit under Arkansas law, the courts relied on a narrow interpretation of
Arkansas's statutory intestacy laws. When a person dies intestate, any por-
tion of the estate "not effectively disposed of by his or her will shall pass to
his or her heirs ... 9 The Arkansas Inheritance Code of 1969 declares that
"[a]ny child conceived following artificial insemination of a married woman
with the consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all purpos-
es of intestate succession."60 Unless there is clear and convincing evidence
showing otherwise, the husband's consent to the artificial insemination is
presumed. 6 1 The Code further provides the applicable law of inheritance for
posthumous descendants:
Posthumous descendants of the intestate conceived before his or her
death but born thereafter shall inherit in the same manner as if born in
the lifetime of the intestate . . . . However, no right of inheritance shall
accrue to any person other than a lineal descendant of the intestate, un-
less such a person has been born at the time of the intestate's death. 62
52. Id., 288 S.W.3d at 687.
53. Finley, 372 Ark. at 104-05, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
54. Id. at 105, 270 S.W.3d at 850.
55. Farm Cat, Inc., 103 Ark. App. at 296, 288 S.W.3d at 689.
56. Finley v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1103-04 (E.D. Ark. 2009).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006).
58. Finley, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-203(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
60. Id. § 28-9-209(c) (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 28-9-21 0(a)-(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2004) (emphasis added).
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As discussed above, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied Wade III any
insurance benefits after narrowly interpreting the intestacy laws.
D. Other States' Laws on the Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Con-
ceived Children
Only a handful of states have addressed whether a child conceived
posthumously through artificial reproductive technology is entitled to inhe-
rit from his or her deceased parent's estate. There is a split of authority on
the issue. Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying Arizona state law, have all ruled that children
conceived posthumously through the use of artificial reproductive technolo-
gy may be entitled to some inheritance benefits. 6 3 In addition to Arkansas,
New Hampshire, Florida, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
California state law, have all decided that posthumously conceived children
are not entitled to receive inheritance benefits from his or her deceased par-
ent.M
1. Posthumously Conceived Children Given Inheritance Rights
This section will look at decisions made by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court,65 the Supreme Court of New Jersey,66 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,6 7 ruling on an appeal from the District of Ari-
zona. All of these courts ruled that posthumously conceived children could
be entitled to inheritance rights from their deceased parent.
a. Massachusetts
In 2002, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled that "limited cir-
cumstances may exist . . . in which posthumously conceived children may
enjoy the inheritance rights of 'issue' under [Massachusetts] intestacy
law."68 Before a child conceived posthumously can enjoy his or her inherit-
ance rights from the deceased parent, the surviving parent has the burden of
proving the following: (1) a genetic relationship between the child and the
deceased parent; (2) that the deceased parent "affirmatively consented to
63. See Infra Section II.D..
64. See Infra Section 1I.D.2.
65. See infra Section II.D.1.a.
66. See infra Section IID. I.b.
67. See infra Section IID. I.c.
68. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002).
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posthumous conception"; and (3) that the deceased parent "affirmatively
consented ... to the support of any resulting child." 6 9
In reaching this decision, the court weighed and analyzed three com-
peting interests: "the best interests of children, the State's interest in the
orderly administration of estates, and the reproductive rights of the genetic
parent." 70 With regard to the first interest, the court found that the legisla-
ture intended for posthumously conceived children to be given "'the same
rights and protections of the law' as children conceived before death." 71 The
State's interest in an orderly administration of estates is furthered by two
intestacy statute requirements: A claimant must prove a genetic relationship
between the deceased parent and the posthumously conceived child and
must also bring the paternity claims within one year against the intestate
estate. 2 The final interest, that of protecting the reproductive rights of the
deceased parent, is furthered by requiring proof of a deceased parent's af-
firmative consent to "posthumous reproduction and the support of any re-
sulting child." 73 After balancing these competing state interests, the Massa-
chusetts court held that posthumously conceived children are entitled to
inherit as long as there is a genetic relationship between the decedent and
the child, the decedent consented to posthumous conception, and the dece-
dent consented to the support of any resulting child.74
b. New Jersey
In 2000, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed a case in which a
mother, Mariantonia Kolacy, sought to have her twin daughters declared
intestate heirs of their deceased father, William Kolacy.75
76This was a case of first impression. Soon after William learned that
he had leukemia, he and his wife, fearing that he may become infertile due
to his cancer or its related treatments, decided to have his sperm harvested
and placed in a sperm bank.77 William died from his leukemia about a year
after being diagnosed.7 8 Nearly one year after his death, an IVF procedure
was successfully completed, and the resulting embryos were placed in Ma-
69. Id. at 259.
70. Id. at 265.
71. Id. at 266; cf MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 1 (West 2007) ("Children born to
parents who are not married to each other shall be entitled to the same rights and protections
of the law as all other children.").
72. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266-67.
73. Id. at 269.
74. Id. at 272.
75. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2000).
76. Id. at 1260.
77. Id at 1258.
78. Id.
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riantonia's womb. 79 Nine months later, Mariantonia gave birth to twin
girls.80 Mariantonia sought to have her daughters declared heirs of William
in New Jersey in order to recover Social Security benefits for them.8
In its decision, the court interpreted the pertinent statutory language in
accordance with the legislature's intent.82 At the time, the statute for post-
humously born heirs read: "'Relatives of the decedent conceived before his
death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of
the decedent.'" 83 The court determined that the legislature had not foreseen
the situation in which a biological, posthumously conceived child could be
born after the death of his or her parent, but the legislature had a general
"intent to enable children to take property from their parents and through
their parents from parental relatives." 84 The court determined that New Jer-
sey should "grant that child the legal status of being an heir of the decedent,
unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other persons or
would cause serious problems in terms of the orderly administration of es-
tates."8 Based on its statutory interpretation, the court recognized the twin
daughters as the legal heirs of their father, William, under the New Jersey
intestate laws.86
c. Arizona
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed an Arizona district court decision that held that two children con-
ceived through IVF after their father's death were not entitled to child's
insurance benefits under the Social Security Act (the "Act"). This was an
issue of first impression for the circuit court.88 In this case, a couple had
attempted to conceive a child, but the wife had fertility problems.89 In addi-
tion, due to cancer, the husband risked becoming sterile once he began
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259.
82. Id. at 1261-62.
83. Id. at 1260. Similar wording is seen in Arkansas's posthumous heir statute, "Post-
humous descendants of the intestate conceived before his or her death but born thereafter
shall inherit in the same manner as if born in the lifetime of the intestate." ARK.CODE ANN. §
28-9-210(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2004). The statute relied on in In re Estate of Kolacy was
amended in 2005 to read: "An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living
at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8
(West Supp. 2010).
84. Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1264.
87. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2004).
88. Id. at 596.
89. Id. at 594.
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chemotherapy treatments. 90 Consequently, before beginning these treat-
ments, the husband deposited sperm to be cryopreserved for his wife's fu-
ture use.91 Before the couple was able to conceive naturally, the husband
died from his cancer.92 About a year and a half after her husband's death,
the mother bore two children following a successful IVF procedure.93
The court found that, based on the facts, it was clear that the two child-
ren were the biological children of the deceased husband. The court also
pointed out that the Social Security Administration had defined the word
"child" as "the natural, or biological child of the insured." 9 5 Therefore, the
posthumously conceived children were to be considered children under the
Act.96 However, in order to receive insurance benefits under the Act, the
children also had to show dependency on the insured.97 Under Arizona law,
"every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to
support and education as if born in lawful wedlock."" The Court deemed
the children dependent upon their deceased father because "all legitimate
children automatically are considered to have been dependent on the insured
individual, absent narrow circumstances not present in this case." 99 Because
the children in this case were legitimate, and as a result of their legitimacy
under Arizona law dependent upon their deceased father who was insured
under the Act, they were entitled to insurance benefits under the Act.'00
2. Posthumously Conceived Children Denied Inheritance Rights
This section will examine decisions made by the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire,' 0 a Florida district court, 10 2 and the United States Court of
90. Id. at 594.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id at 595.
94. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596-97.
95. Id. at 596.
96. Id. at 597.
97. Id. at 594 (citing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-601(2007)); see 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)
(2006) ("Every child ... of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits,
or of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child . . . (C) was
dependent upon such individual .. . (ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death
... shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit . . .
98. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-601 (2007).
99. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598. Narrow circumstances include instances when the
parent "was not living with or contributing to the support of such child and . . . such child is
neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or . . . such child had been
adopted by some other individual." 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (2006).
100. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599.
101. See infra Section II.D.2.a.
102. See infra Section II.D.2.b.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,'03 ruling on a case from California. Along
with Arkansas,'0" these courts have determined that children conceived
posthumously through the use of artificial reproductive technologies are not
entitled to inheritance rights from their deceased parent.
a. New Hampshire
In 2007, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire determined whether "a
child conceived after her father's death via artificial insemination [was]
eligible to inherit from her father as his surviving issue under New Hamp-
shire intestacy law."'os In 1997, after finding out he had a terminal illness,
Rumzi Brian Khabbaz began banking his sperm with the hope "that his wife
could conceive a child through artificial insemination."' 0 6 In addition to his
desire to allow his wife access to his sperm, he "executed a consent form
indicating that the sperm could be used by his wife 'to achieve pregnancy'
and that it was his 'desire and intent to be legally recognized as the father of
the child to the fullest extent allowable by law."'"0 7 After Mr. Khabbaz's
death, his wife used the banked sperm in an artificial insemination proce-
dure to conceive a child. 08 Following the birth of their child, the mother
sought Social Security survivor's benefits for her daughter.109 However,
before the child could receive survivor's benefits, she had to be eligible to
inherit from her father under New Hampshire intestacy law." 0
To determine her eligibility, the court relied on the state statute that
controls the estate distribution of a person who dies intestate.," This statute
states: "The part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse . .
passes as follows: (a) To the issue of the decedent equally if they are all of
the same degree of kinship to the decedent . . . .2 The court explained
that, when interpreting this statute, it would apply "plain and ordinary
meaning to the words used" and would "interpret legislative intent from the
statute as written and [would] not consider what the legislature might have
said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include."" The
court subsequently determined that the statute, when viewed in its entirety,
103. See infra Section II.D.2.c.
104. See supra Part B.
105. Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1183.
112. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (II) (LexisNexis 2006); Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at
1183.
113. Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182-83.
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expressed a legislative intent to allow only those persons who survive a
decedent to be eligible to inherit from his or her estate. 1 14 Thus, unless a
person wishing to inherit as an heir is alive at the time of the decedent's
death, he or she will be unable to inherit. 15 As a result, posthumously con-
ceived children are not afforded inheritance rights in New Hampshire.
b. Florida
In 2005, a Florida district court addressed whether a posthumously
conceived child was entitled to inherit under Florida intestacy law so that
the child would be eligible to receive child's survivor benefits under the
Social Security Act.' 16 About a month after Michelle Stephen married her
husband, Gar, he died of a heart attack." 7 The day after his death, Michelle
had sperm taken from Gar's body and cryopreserved for future use."' After
many unsuccessful IVF efforts, Michelle finally became pregnant and had a
son three years after her husband's death.119 She subsequently filed for
child's survivor benefits in her son's name.12 0
In this case, Florida law controlled parentage and inheritance rights,
the determination of which is essential to establish whether a child can re-
ceive Social Security survivor benefits from a deceased parent's estate. 12 1
Florida enacted a statute in 1993 that directs the inheritance rights of post-
humously conceived children. Under Florida law, "a child conceived from
the sperm of a person who died before the transfer of sperm to a woman's
body is not eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child
has been provided for by the decedent's will." 22 Because the child in this
case was not born until more than three years after his father's death, and
the father died without a will, the child was not eligible to claim against the
decedent's estate.12 3
c. California
In 2009, five years after its ruling in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided a California
case involving the same issue concerning the inheritance rights of a post-
114. Id. at 1184.
115. Id.
116. Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1264.
122. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2010)).
123. Id at 1265.
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humously conceived child.124 However, the governing state law in this case
was quite different. After being married five years, the husband, Bruce Ver-
noff, died unexpectedly and the wife, Gabriela, asked a doctor to take semen
from her late husband's body.12 5 About three years following her husband's
death, the wife used her husband's sperm in an IVF procedure, and she gave
birth to their child, Brandalynn.12 6 The mother brought an action to receive
child survivor benefits from the Social Security Administration for Branda-
lynn.12 7 In order to recover under the Social Security Act, Brandalynn had to
establish that Bruce Vernoff was her parent under the relevant state family
law provisions. 128
Under California law, a child can show dependency on a parent in the
following three ways: (1) establish actual dependency at the time of the
deceased's death; (2) establish legitimacy and dependency, like in Gillett-
Netting; or (3) establish a right to inherit under the California intestacy
laws.12 9 In this case, the court could not declare Brandalynn dependent un-
der any of these options.
The first option was not available because the child was not yet con-
ceived at the time of the deceased's death. 3 0 The child also could not prove
dependency under the second option because no California law supported
the proposition that Bruce Vernoff was the "natural" parent of Branda-
lynn.131 Under California law, having a biological relationship with a child
does not equate to being a natural father.13 2 One method of showing that a
father is a natural parent in California is through the use of the statutory
presumption. The presumption is that when a father and mother have been
married, the father is the natural parent of any child born during the mar-
riage or within 300 days after the marriage has ended or the decedent has
died.133 However, because Brandalynn was born about three years after her
biological father's death, this presumption did not apply.'34 The deceased
father also could not be declared Brandalynn's natural father under this
124. Vernoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); see Gillett-Netting v. Barn-
hart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
125. Vernoff 568 F.3d at 1105.
126. Id.
127. Id
128. Id. at 1106.
129. Id. at 106-07.
130. Id. at ll07.
131. Vernoff 568 F.3d at 1109-10.
132. Id. at 1108.
133. Id. at 1109; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(West Supp. 2010), invalidated by In re
Jerry P., 95 Cal. App. 4th 793 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2002).
134. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1109.
2010] 103
UALR LAW REVIEW
second option because he did not consent to the removal or use of his
sperm.135
Brandalynn also did not meet the requirements of the third option to
establish dependency on the deceased-insured.13 6 This option is only satis-
fied if a child can show that he or she is entitled to inherit from the decedent
through California intestacy laws in effect at the time of the decedent's
death.13 7 The court found that Brandalynn did not meet any of the require-
ments in the California Probate Code138 to be entitled to inherit from the
Bruce Vernoff's estate.139 Because Brandalynn could not prove dependency
on her biological father, she was not entitled to inherit from his estate under
California law.14 0
III. ANALYSIS
Jurisdictions that deny inheritance rights to children who are conceived
posthumously through the use of artificial reproductive technologies are
potentially causing those children and their surviving parents several prob-
lems. However, because children conceived posthumously are no different
than children conceived before the death of one of their parents, they should
be treated equally in the eyes of the law. There are several ways these juris-
dictions, including Arkansas, can resolve these inheritance and Social Secu-
rity benefits problems in order to pave the way for posthumously conceived
children to inherit from their deceased parent.
A. The State Legislature Should Address the Problem
In 1978, the first child conceived outside of a woman's body was
born.141 Five years after this first "test-tube baby," the first child was born
135. Id.
136. Id. atlll l-12.
137. Id. at I 11.
138. The court laid out the following three methods of establishing dependency under
section 402(d)(3): (1) by "show[ing] actual dependency at the time of the insured's death";
(2) by "establishing that the insured is [his or] her 'parent' under California law provisions
and . . . therefore, deemed both legitimate and dependent" ; or (3) by establishing legitimacy
under section 416(h)(2) so that the child may inherit under the California intestacy laws from
the insured. Vernoff 568 F.3d at 1106-07.
139. Id. at 1110-11; see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6407 (West 2009) (section does not extend
intestacy rights to posthumously conceived children), 6453 (West 2009) (section is inapplic-
able because it has not been established that the father was the "natural" father), and 249.5
(West Supp. 2010) (section is inapplicable because it was enacted after the father's death, but
it still would not give the child inheritance rights because the father did not consent to the
artificial insemination procedure, nor was the conception timely).
140. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at I111.
141. Janet L. Dolgin, Surrounding Embryos: Biology, Ideology, and Politics, 16 HEALTH
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from a cryopreserved embryo. 142 However, because Arkansas law concern-
ing posthumously born children has not been amended since 1969, it does
not include any provisions for children conceived posthumously through
assisted reproductive technologies. 14 3 As IVF and cryopreservation have
become more commonplace, several state legislatures have begun address-
ing the inheritance status of children conceived posthumously. Several have
modeled their intestacy laws concerning posthumously conceived children
after the Uniform Parentage Act. This Act provides:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted re-
production dies before the placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the de-
ceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to
occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child.
144
Other states have imposed additional requirements, beyond express
consent. Some have established time restraints that dictate whether a child
conceived posthumously may be able to inherit from a deceased parent's
estate. 145 Florida requires that a posthumously conceived child be provided
for in the decedent's will in order to make a claim against the deceased par-
ent's estate. 14 6 The Arkansas legislature should also establish time con-
straints for claims against a father's estate in order to avoid additional intes-
tate issues. Restricting claims against a father's estate to two or three years
after a father's death would not be unduly burdensome on the surviving
heirs of an estate or beneficiaries of a will.
MATRIX 27, 36 (2006).
142. Dena S. Davis, The Puzzle of IVF, 6 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 275,282 (2006).
143. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-9-201-220 (LEXIS Repl. 2004).
144. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002); see ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (LexisNexis 2009)
(deceased spouse must have consented in a record maintained by the licensed assisting phy-
sician); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 194-106 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2008) (deceased
spouse must have consented in a record kept by a licensed physician); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B- 15-707 (LexisNexis 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West 2005).
145. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5-.8 (West Supp. 2010) (child conceived and born
after the death of the decedent shall be deemed to have been born in the lifetime of the dece-
dent if the decedent expressed an intent in writing to have his or genetic material used post-
humously and the child was in utero using the decedent's genetic material within two years
of decedent's death); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2008) (parent must consent in writing
and child must be born within three years of death of parent); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158
(2008) (deceased parent must consent in writing before embryo implantation or the embryo
implantation must occur before the notice of death can reasonably be communicated to the
doctor performing the implantation).
146. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2010).
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B. A Different Statutory Interpretation
When the legislature enacted the Arkansas Inheritance Code of 1969, it
did not foresee the widespread use of assisted reproductive technology by
couples wishing to have biological children together, let alone the possibili-
ty of posthumously conceived children. Because of this, courts should in-
terpret the intestacy statute more broadly. Arkansas and New Jersey have
nearly identical statutes, 147 but when presented with similar cases, their
courts have reached opposite results. The Arkansas Supreme Court should
apply a broader interpretation of the statute, just as the New Jersey court did
in In re Kolacy. In that case, the court found the general legislative intent
was to grant all offspring of a decedent the legal status of an heir.148 That
court preferred to use the general intent of the legislature because a "literal
reading of statutes did not consciously purport to deal with the kind of prob-
lem before [it]."149
The Finley court expressed concerns about interfering in an area where
the legislature should control the issue." 0 However, as the New Jersey court
pointed out, "[s]imple justice requires [the court] to do the best [it] can with
the statutory law which is presently available." 5' When people come into
court with issues that are not currently addressed by the legislature, like
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children, "judges cannot
simply put those problems on hold in the hope that some day (which may
never come) the Legislature will deal with the problem in question."' 5 2 A
statutory interpretation that allows posthumously conceived children to in-
herit, within a reasonable amount of time and subject to the technologies of
the day, results in a just outcome.
C. Judicial Decree
In the absence of written consent, when justice requires, a judge can
find implied consent through the facts of a case. After being presented with
all the evidence and hearing all the testimony from interested parties, a court
may be able to determine "that the decedent wished to procreate after death,
[so] the resulting child should be allowed to take under the decedent's es-
tate."'53
147. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
148. See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000).
149. Id.
150. Finley v. Astrue, 372 Ark. 103, 112, 270 S.W.3d 849, 855 (2008).
151. Id. at 1261-62.
152. Id. at 1261.
153. Michael K. Elliott, Tales of Parenthood From the Crypt: The Predicament of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47,67 (2004).
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In the Finley case, such an assumption would have been reasonable.
Based on all of the testimony, the court could have concluded that Wade Jr.
wished to procreate, even after death. Unlike the California case, where the
wife had sperm taken from her deceased husband's body, Amy and Wade
Jr. both actively participated in the creation of embryos that they planned to
use in the future if their first IVF procedure did not result in a term pregnan-
cy.154 Thus, even though Wade Jr.'s death was unexpected, he had still tak-
en steps that allowed for the future use of his gametes. When the Finleys
began artificial reproduction treatments and procedures at UAMS, they
were doing it with the intent of producing a child. Wade Jr. even signed a
consent form to recognize any children resulting from the procedure as his
legitimate children.155 If they did not want to have any children in the fu-
ture, they could have disposed of the other fertilized embryos, rather than
having them cryopreserved for future use. A court could have found that
Wade Jr. implicitly consented to fathering children after his death.
If intent to conceive a child can be gathered from the actions of the fa-
ther before his death, courts should allow the posthumously conceived child
to inherit and receive benefits from his father's estate.
D. Define the Moment of Conception
The Finley court said it was not going to define the moment of concep-
tion in order to determine the rights of Wade 111.156 However, a concise de-
finition of the term "conceive" would resolve problems arising in future
cases involving children born after a postmortem embryo implantation. A
common definition of "conception" includes "the process of becoming
pregnant involving fertilization or implantation or both."' Amy and Wade
Jr. had Amy's eggs fertilized with Wade Jr.'s sperm before Wade Jr.'s
death. Applying the above definition, this moment, before Wade Jr.'s death,
would qualify as the moment of conception. If Wade III was deemed to
have been "conceived" before his father's death, he would be entitled to
inherit from his father's estate in Arkansas.
IV. CONCLUSION
When a posthumously conceived child is denied inheritance rights, that
child is treated differently and unfairly from a child conceived during the
lives of both parents. When a couple chooses to use artificial reproductive
154. Finley, 372 Ark. 103, 106, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850.
155. Id.,270S.W.3dat851.
156. Id. at I11, 270 S.W.3d at 854.
157. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/conception (last visited July 9, 2010).
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technologies to have a child, that child is no less of a child to the couple
than one conceived naturally. It is fundamentally unfair to treat a posthu-
mously conceived child differently by not allowing that child to enjoy inhe-
ritance rights from a deceased parent. When a posthumously conceived
child is still the intended, biological child of a deceased parent, that child
should receive the Social Security benefits a decedent has accrued as well as
his or her respective inheritance from the decedent's estate.
The Arkansas Legislature should clearly define the inheritance rights
of posthumously conceived children. Arkansas should follow the lead of
several other states and model its legislation after the Uniform Parentage
Act.158 A signed acknowledgment, expressing the decedent's desire that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after his or her death, the decedent
would be the parent of the resulting child would easily resolve this issue.
However, until the Arkansas Legislature clarifies the law on children
born after the death of a parent through the means of assisted reproductive
technology, courts should interpret the Arkansas Inheritance Code of 1969
more broadly, issue judicial decrees based on the intent of the decedent, or
define the moment of conception to include the fertilization of a mother's
egg by the father's sperm. These alternative solutions are all possible ways
that children like Wade III could be protected under Arkansas intestacy laws
and be eligible to inherit from a deceased parent's estate. Eligibility to claim
against a parent's estate will also lead to the receipt of Social Security
child's survivor benefits.
Lisa Medford
158. Seesupranote 138.
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